A Coherent, Coordinated International Response Is Needed to Address the Afghan Crisis
Even while the Taliban’s errors hurt their own interests, Afghans suffer more because of them. The international community may take the following action.
The Taliban have made a number of mistakes during the last year, particularly in recent months. The effects won’t threaten their authority in the near term, but they will harm their capacity for leadership and, maybe, their long-term cohesiveness. Unfortunately, these errors will cause considerably more damage to the Afghan people, both directly and indirectly via their detrimental effects on humanitarian relief. Aid to Afghanistan is likely to decrease even more drastically in reaction to the Taliban’s treatment of women and girls, which was already anticipated to shrink in the next years. So far, the international reaction has been reactive and fragmented, with the exception of broad condemnations and a significant diplomatic agreement on nonrecognition of the Taliban administration. Numerous Afghans are suffering right now as a result of the Taliban’s bans on female education and Afghan women working for NGOs and the UN. If these restrictions are upheld in the long run, they will seriously harm Afghanistan’s economic and social development. Countries cannot go from extreme poverty and low per capita incomes to better income status without female labor force participation, which offers significant economic advantages for growth and development. Although women are not officially prohibited from working in the private sector, Afghan businesses have lost female workers as a result of the general climate. The secondary education of girls, according to evidence from throughout the world, is essential for enhancing a nation’s health results.
The Taliban’s prohibitions have harmed their government as well. The Taliban doubled down and issued a stern directive after the secondary school restriction for females revealed internal divisions. The Taliban emir is Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada. The Taliban’s overall cohesiveness and authority are not in danger as a result of the restrictions, but they do make it harder for the government to portray itself as fully united in the eyes of Afghan society and the outside world. The combined impact might grow more severe if the Taliban’s reputation continues to deteriorate and get damaged in other ways over time, such as via increasing corruption.
By limiting humanitarian help, the sanctions will also hurt the Taliban regime. Even while most projects look to be able to continue for the time being, albeit with considerably reduced levels of activity, the restriction on Afghan women working in NGOs will undoubtedly affect the delivery of certain help. Furthermore, the prohibitions have caused donors’ motivation and capacity to maintain a high level of humanitarian help (approximately $3 billion last year) to rapidly erode. The United Nations’ humanitarian plea for this year has received virtually little response so far, and early signs suggest that help may decrease by 30–50% in 2023. According to World Bank predictions, decreased assistance would cause the economy to experience negative growth, which will result in a considerable decline in per capita incomes, a deepening of poverty and hardship, and maybe even famine-like circumstances for many.
The Taliban claim to not care about humanitarian help and will blame the international world for a substantial fall in aid, but this will affect their government in a number of ways.
First, the Taliban cannot avoid responsibility for the nation’s economic decline and the country’s rising poverty, misery, and hunger, which will cause problems for the regime.
Additionally, with less help, the United Nations will provide less money to Afghanistan (averaging $40 million per week in 2022). These influxes supported the currency rate and restrained inflation, which helped to stabilize the economy. Losing this cash will make it more difficult for the Taliban to control the macroeconomic situation.
Third, providing help to those in need necessarily benefits the Taliban and related parties. These include getting paid to provide security for U.N. traveling missions, patronage (employment opportunities), and possibly corruption. They also include at least some ability to direct the distribution of food aid and other relief goods to favored beneficiaries (who, even if deserving, get to the front of the line). These advantages will decrease in direct proportion to a decrease in assistance.
Economic Errors
Although they have not received as much media attention, the Taliban’s economic mistakes are nonetheless harmful. The most startling part is that, however slowly and unevenly throughout the nation, they are really enforcing the opium prohibition that was declared last year. This comes after they implemented a prohibition on processed goods and ephedra, which will eventually lead to crystal meth. These restrictions and the removal of opium poppies are detrimental to the regime’s economic interests and may, in certain cases, weaken its unity. The Taliban’s effective opium prohibition in 2000–2001 only applied to the growing of poppies; the present ban also covers trading and processing.
It is clear that there is widespread unhappiness with and varied degrees of evasion or resistance to the opium prohibition. Additionally, corruption will unavoidably arise as a result of the crackdown. Additionally, the opium prohibition would weaken Afghanistan’s already fragile economy by slashing rural revenues by up to hundreds of millions of dollars annually. In the long run, it will be crucial to phase out the drug economy in order to reduce widespread addiction, but this prohibition, which lacks any kind of development plan, is not the place to start.
The Taliban rule possibly outperformed the preceding Islamic Republic administration during its first year in power by taking advantage of the budget and tax structures. However, the emir and his entourage’s pressure may be eroding budget procedures. In addition to continued high spending on the security sector, which accounts for about the same percentage of overall expenditures as it did during the Islamic Republic, there has also been significant spending on the offices of the emir and prime minister as well as cash set aside for unanticipated situations. According to reports, there have been instances when the leadership has bypassed budget processes and ordered the Ministry of Finance to pay money directly to certain people, sometimes in cash. Some stories claim that Mullah Hidayatullah Badri, who was serving as acting finance minister at the time, complained about the involvement and who the emir eventually transferred to the lower-ranking post of governor of Da Afghanistan Bank (the central bank). While there was reportedly little money in the government coffers under the first Taliban dictatorship in the 1990s and Taliban commander Mullah Omar handled cash payments individually, it is not how the $2 billion annual national budget the Taliban presently control is run.
Last but not least, it’s possible that the upward revenue patterns and relative macroeconomic stability seen over the last year won’t continue. Many of the substantial revenue gains are attributable to expanding the tax base to include foreign commerce, collecting taxes that the previous Ghani government was unable to collect, and enacting new levies. These elements don’t support ongoing income development; they only provide a temporary boost. Additionally, in an already very fragile economy, the Taliban’s aggressive tax collection tactics run the danger of lowering economic incentives. Therefore, revenue growth will likewise be modest since the Afghan economy will, at most, continue to develop slowly in the future. This will increase pressure on the Taliban leadership, especially if budget money are being diverted by the leadership more often.
Politics of Power Dynamics or the Victory of Ideology over Pragmatism?
The Taliban’s treatment of women and girls, as well as the prohibition on opium, are both inconsistent with good governance and, at the very least, don’t seem to benefit the regime. Pragmatic issues may be overridden by ideological fanaticism, along with the belief that female education and involvement in NGOs and the U.N. furthers foreign goals. Another reason for these activities might be that they represent the emir’s attempts to consolidate authority around himself. Thirdly, the Taliban “base” of fighters and lower-level commanders may have been so ingrained with the emir’s hard-line cultural stance throughout the conflict. However, it appears improbable that the Taliban base is exerting pressure on the leadership in all the areas where they have erred, including the economy (such as the opium prohibition). Regardless of the causes, the Taliban’s activities are not a reaction to external pressures and incentives but rather the result of internal dynamics. In contrast, the 2000 prohibition on the production of opium poppies by the previous Taliban leadership was meant to help the rule gain worldwide legitimacy.
A recurring theme in Afghan history is the triumphant new administrations’ self-destructive overreach. This took place following the “accidental” coup of April 1978, which unexpectedly put Marxist-Leninist ideologues and army personnel who supported the Soviet Union in power. Resistance was sparked by hurried and poorly planned land reforms and social measures, while political opponents were executed and imprisoned in large numbers, sparking cycles of retaliation that still exist today. It also occurred when the Taliban were unexpectedly quickly defeated in late 2001, which sparked retaliatory murders, social exclusion, counterterrorism operations against them, and — taking the win for granted — the inability to reach an early peace accord with the Taliban. In other instances, the fallout was immediate (1978), or the groundwork was laid for setbacks a few years later (2001). The present state of affairs is quite different: there is no significant, organized, armed resistance to the ruling system, much less one that is backed by foreign nations. Therefore, the negative consequences for the government might be postponed and will probably depend on how internal Taliban dynamics develop.
Worldwide Response
The U.N. Security Council has condemned the Taliban’s treatment of women and girls with unanimity, and there is a diplomatic understanding that it is not yet appropriate to take steps toward the Taliban regime’s formal recognition. While repeating the condemnations, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has not mounted a more forceful defense. There don’t seem to be any intentions to halt any significant assistance initiatives, much alone have any UN agencies leave the nation. This comes after NGOs responded in a similar way to the Taliban’s prohibition on Afghan women working for NGOs; it seems that current projects are typically continuing at levels of activity between 70 and 80 percent. Additionally, the Taliban’s economic missteps and, more broadly, their handling of the Afghan economy have not been rectified by the international reaction.
What are the least-bad tactical choices to pursue in this dire circumstance to mount a more potent defense? Here are several ideas, largely relating to the economy and help.
First, the international reaction might be based on the general agreement that the Taliban rule should not be recognized until its social programs have undergone considerable modifications, which is unlikely in the near future. But in a variety of economic and other sectors, practical, results-oriented participation can and should be undertaken.
Second, measures should not merely be tactical in response to Taliban acts. Dealing with a government that does not concern itself with the material well-being of its own citizens presents a “humanitarian dilemma” for the international community. However, reasonable guidelines and strategies may be followed, such as:
“Do no harm” or, more practically, “limit the harm” that foreign acts do to Afghans.
Recognize the advantages that help brings to the Taliban and take steps to prevent it.
Instead of siloing related initiatives (such as “basic needs” vs “humanitarian” programs), create a comprehensive assistance strategy.
Pay attention to the Afghan private sector and economic stability, which would help Afghans.
Third, the unavoidable downward trend in assistance to Afghanistan must be controlled and reduced in order to limit additional harm and prevent a shock similar to that brought on by the aid’s sudden suspension after the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021. Several possibilities are:
Utilizing some of the $3.5 billion in Afghan central bank reserves in the Swiss fund to support economic adjustment (not for humanitarian aid); cushioning the aid decline with modest support from the World Bank/Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and Asian Development Bank, focused on small-scale infrastructure, financial transfers to households, and income generation projects.
Fourth, aid efficacy has to be increased to lessen the damage that decreasing foreign help would do to Afghans. Programs need to be ranked in order of cost-effectiveness. This necessitates deviations from humanitarian operations as normal. For instance, monetary transfers are often preferable over in-kind assistance.
Fifth, it is crucial to investigate and put into practice novel assistance distribution methods, including as digital transfers to beneficiaries’ mobile phone accounts, which would eventually lessen the unsafe reliance on pricey U.N. cash shipments that benefit the Taliban. Make better use of the private sector in Afghanistan to provide relief.
Improve assistance coordination and seek pro-active non-financial participation in the Afghan economy, to finish. A multinational organization that is not constrained by sometimes ambiguous political and humanitarian missions is best suited to lead these areas. The World Bank might effectively fill these tasks if given the go-ahead and is adequately refocused and retooled.
